MANAGING SKILLED ECONOMIC MIGRATION IN EUROPE:
DEBATES AND POLICY OUTCOMES

Elif Cetin

INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

MANAGING SKILLED ECONOMIC MIGRATION IN EUROPE: DEBATES AND POLICY OUTCOMES

Elif Cetin

University of Cambridge

Department of Politics and International Studies

ec409@cam.ac.uk

Abstract: Immigration has turned into a politically sensitive issue in almost all of the economically developed receiving states. Particularly in Europe, this situation has led to the replacement of post-war laissez-faire approaches to labour migration with tighter policies in a number of countries, influencing also the entry conditions of high-skilled migrants from the third countries in a restrictive manner despite existing labour market demands in these high-income countries for employing high-skilled workers (Abella and Ducanes 2009; Cerna and Hynes 2009). This paper analyses how rhetorical references made by the key political parties in the UK and Italy to high-skilled migration during election campaigns inform policy-making in this specific area of migration management. Lowell's (2005: 2) highly-skilled migrant definition is adopted which follows that 'highly skilled persons are in high-value-added and high productivity jobs that are essential to our knowledge society'. Building on the literature which underlines the role of ideas and discourse while offering an explanation of policy formation processes and policy changes (Blyth 1997; Geddes and Guiraudon 2004; Hay and Rosamond 2002; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004; Schmidt 2008), the paper examines how high-skilled migration is dominantly addressed in electoral campaigns in Europe and assesses how different rhetorical categories are accommodated within policies regulating the influx of highly skilled migrants. The UK and Italy are singled out as case studies and the comparison is made by concentrating on the years 1996-2010. It addresses the following questions: - How is the dominant electoral positioning on high-skilled immigration in Britain and Italy? - How do these electoral positions inform the actual design of policies that apply to high-skilled migration? - What does such an evaluation of policy debates and outcomes reveal about shifting policies in the domain of skilled economic migration?

Introduction

In Europe the increasing volume of international population movements created various pressures, in relation to the protection of the external borders, welfare state, cultural and ethnic identity. The global economic crisis starting by 2007 exacerbated views favouring the introduction of further immigration restrictions within both public and political circles. The economic shock that many European governments had to face with influenced also the entry conditions of high-skilled migrants from the third countries in a restrictive manner despite existing labour market demands in these high-income countries for employing high-skilled workers (Abella and Ducanes 2009; Cerna and Hynes 2009).

This paper argues that high-skilled migration is approached under different lights in the UK and Italy both at the rhetorical and practical levels. The difference is due to, first of all, variations in the composition of economic sectors that define the form of 'production strategies, product market competition tactics, production patterns, and employment patterns' (Menz 2009: 238), and also due to the existence of different political histories (Ambrosini 2008: 44). While it is possible to talk about a unified national economy in the case of the UK, the political divisions between the Northern and the Southern parts of Italy remained even after its unification in 1861, and these differences also show themselves in the country's economic structure, rendering the adoption of a holistic approach towards the Italian labour market highly improbable. The dual economy in Italy is marked by, as Menz (2009: 236) formulates, 'high tech islands and seas of low-skill assembly' meaning that small and medium-sized enterprises are the 'pivotal sources of economic activity' (ibid.: 238) in the country. Italian economy's heavy dependence on sectors that demand un-skilled or low-skilled migration lowers incentives for employers to actively seek for the recruitment of highly-skilled migrants which results in the shift of political attention on different aspects of immigration in Italy both at the discursive and the practical level.

In the UK, on the contrary, both the rhetorical references and the policy tools for managing the highly skilled worker and student inflows are more prominent when compared with the situation in Italy.[1] Hence, despite the financial crisis starting in 2007 put new pressures on the British governments to adopt more restrictive immigration discourses and policies, ensuring the inflow of those migrants who would fill in the skills gap is still valued

---

[1] The UK is one of the few European countries where high-skill migration schemes are officially established. As of the writing of this paper, Italy does not have such official programmes designed specifically for the highly skilled.

in the UK and there is no paradigmatic change in labour migration. The fact that the favourable approach towards high-skilled migration that was set in the early 2000s with the introduction of the points-based system was not put aside following the outbreak of the economic crisis is a clear indication of this sustained policy line.

Nonetheless, maintaining a relatively liberal stance towards high-skilled migration comes at the expense of further politicisation of the approach towards un-/low-skilled and irregular migrants together with asylum-claimants. Thus, the UK falls into the category of 'reluctant importer' (Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994) where the government seeks to address both the preference of market forces for further opening up of labour market to new migrant influxes and public concerns about migration (Ambrosini 2008: 31). Such dichotomies exist also in Italy but with respect to the recruitment of un-skilled and low-skilled foreign workers that the Italian economy requires; not regarding high-skilled workers as the country does not have a specific scheme applying to highly skilled immigrants yet.

The UK and Italy are seen as relevant case studies to refer to while elaborating on how labour migration polices are shaped during a process which moves from rhetoric to action. The two countries starkly differ in terms of their histories as countries of immigration. While Britain has traditionally served as a 'hub' of migratory flows (Smith 2008: 419) experiencing both emigration and immigration (Layton-Henry 1992), Italy has long been a country of emigration and only beginning from the mid-1970s, it started experiencing positive migration balance (Martiniello 1992; Papademetriou and Hamilton 1996; Zincone and Caponio 2005). Yet, the two countries show similarities in terms of the existence of politicised approaches towards immigration.

The paper is developed in five stages. The first part presents the analytical and methodological approach adopted in this study. As immigration policy-making is quite closely connected to the general policy-making context, the second part introduces the defining features of the political contexts influencing immigration policy-making in the UK and Italy. The third part provides an overall account of recent immigration to the UK and Italy. Then the electoral positioning of the key political parties in the UK and Italy on high-skilled migration during the concerned time frame is elaborated upon through an analysis of their general election manifestos. The fifth part investigates the key developments towards the treatment of the highly skilled in these two countries and assesses the extent to which debates developed during campaigning periods inform and shape the policy actions.

I. MIGRATION MANAGEMENT: MOVING FROM DISCOURSE TO PRACTICE

In the analysis of whether and how debates on high-skilled migration influence the design of the policy tools for managing the inflows of the highly skilled, a useful concept to adopt would be 'discourse'. In this paper, Vivien Schmidt's (2008) definition of discourse is employed. According to Schmidt (2008: 303), discourse is 'the interactive process of conveying ideas'. It may either take place among policy actors (i.e. coordinative discourse) or happen between 'political actors and the public' (i.e. communicative discourse). While it can be particularly challenging to keep a track of the development of certain ideas conveyed in coordinative forms of discourses, because they take place among a closed group of policy actors away from public scrutiny, through comparative research and 'process-tracing', the way these ideas are 'tied to action' (ibid.: 308) can be demonstrated, which is also what this paper aims to do. Therefore, informed by such an approach, the study looks at types of communicative discourses on high-skilled migration developed during election campaign periods and elaborates on whether these discourses define the policy-making tools in the post-election period by providing both 'justification' and 'legitimation' to actions of the key political players operating in the migration policy domain (Berman 1998, 2006; Blyth 2002).

The paper analyses the political rhetoric in the UK and Italy on skilled migration by contextualising it in the frame labour migration. For the UK, the analysed election programmes are comprised of those used by the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats (LibDem) and the British National Party (BNP) for the 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2010 general elections.

For Italy, the analysed election campaigns are those that took place in 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2008. Unlike the UK, where the electoral positioning of the same set of political parties (i.e. the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats, the British National Party) could be conducted over the relevant time period, within the Italian context, the composition of the analysed parties show some variations depending on the year. The dramatic changes in the Italian political scenery in the early 1990s led to the creation of what Ieraci (2008) refers as 'polarised bi-polarism'. This meant the loss of the former stability in Italian politics established by the so-called *pentapartito* system which was based on a taken-for-granted understanding between the centre-right Christian Democrats (DC) and the smaller parties of the centre (i.e. Liberals, Republicans, Social Democrats and (from 1963) the Socialists) to exclude the Communist (*Partito Comunista Italiano*/PCI) and the neo-fascist

Italian Social Movement-National Right (*Movimento Sociale Italiano*/MSI-DS) from holding government posts. After the political scandals of the early 1990s which led to the disintegration of the two key parties that dominated the Italian political landscape for a long time, namely the Christian Democratic and the Socialist parties, an electoral reform was introduced in 1993 which brought a peculiar mixture of proportional representation and plurality by paving the way for 'alternative modes of political competition' (Cotta and Verzichelli 2007: 78). While political parties sought to unite under the roof of large, and usually ideologically heterogeneous and in-cohesive electoral coalitions due to the plurality portion of the electoral system, intra-coalitional conflicts and splits were also quite common as the proportional representation element motivated parties to make their individual appeals to their constituencies (Ieraci 2008: 4-5).

Yet, such volatility of the Italian political party system does not hinder the comparability of political debates developed during different election campaign periods. The reason lies in the fact that the players in the political scenery remained the same to a great extent and what might appear as a highly dynamic party formation process at the first sight would be mostly about re-branding of some old practices and positions.

Table-1 summarises the Italian political parties' and election coalitions' whose positioning on high-skilled migration is elaborated upon in this paper. The classification of the individual parties as either the Left or the Right was informed by the general political inclination of their coalitions, in addition to some self-proclaimed titles, such as *Rifondazione Comunista* (Communist Re-foundation) which clearly distances its committed political position away from the Right. For instance, as *Centro Cristiano Democratico* (Democratic Christian Centre) was part of the centre-left *Ulivo* (Olive Tree) coalition during the 1996 general elections and in addition to adhering to the coalition manifesto, it issued a separate document underlining the party's political priorities it was classified under the label 'Left'. Yet, this small party, again with a concern to maximise its chances to be elected to the Parliament, coalesced itself with the right-wing *Casa delle Liberta'* during the 2001 general elections.

Table 1 List of Political Parties and Coalitions Referred for the Electoral Manifesto Analysis			
		Left	**Right**
1996		Partito Popolare Italiano	Forza Italia
		Centro Cristiano Democratico	Lega Nord
	Individual Political Parties	Rifondazione Comunista	Alleanza Nazionale
	Coalitions	Ulivo	Alleanza Democratica
2001			
	Individual Political Parties	Rifondazione Comunista	Centro Cristiano Democratico
	Coalitions	Ulivo	Casa delle Liberta'
2006	**Individual Political Parties**	N/A	N/A
	Coalitions	Unione	Casa delle Liberta'
2008	**Individual Political Parties**	Partito Democratico	Lega Nord
		Sinistra Arcobaleno	Polo delle Liberta'-Lega Nord
	Coalitions	Unione Di Centro (UDC) (centre party)	

Due to that, it was put under political 'Right'. Thus, the categories in Table 1 are defined in order to capture such dynamic shifts in the positioning of parties within different election coalitions.

II. IMMIGRATION APPROACHES IN DIFFERENT DOMESTIC POLICY-MAKING CONTEXTS

The UK Immigration Policy-Making as Part of the Wider Policy Context

In the UK, as Leach notes (1995: 33), political activity takes place on various different levels that cover 'the elite politics of the Cabinet room and the corridors of Whitehall and Westminster', 'the internal processes of political parties and major pressure groups', 'the

mass level of voting, and the 'grassroots' activities of participation in ward party meetings or local pressure group activities.'

Yet, the specific realm concerning immigration policy-making has been mainly under the political elites' control. As highlighted in the relevant literature, immigration policy-making in the UK develops to a great part as an elite-led project (Balch 2010; Menz 2009; Statham and Geddes 2006) within a highly institutionalised setting 'with a relatively weak level of civil society engagement' (Statham and Geddes 2006: 248). Furthermore, immigration policy change could be achieved relatively smoothly due to the highly centralised nature of British political system where the executive is strong (Cocker and Jones 2002: 120) and has the power to 'impose' its decisions, instead of negotiating with 'a wide range of policy actors' (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 188).

The two major parties, the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, which, since 1945, had dominant parliamentary representations and 'monopolised control of government' (Leach, in Mullard 1995: 38), played key roles in shaping the post-World War II immigration and asylum system in the UK.

In general, the UK immigration policy-making is characterised by the cautious approach of these mainstream political parties not to adopt a racist rhetoric regarding immigrants, even though there were brief periods during which both parties were seduced by opportunistic gains (Coleman, in Fassman and Münz 1994; Freeman, in Messina et. al. 1992; Freeman 1995; Hatton and Wheatley Price, in Zimmermann 2005). Nevertheless, it should also be noted that even though the mainstream had the desire to avoid radical views from gaining support through the abuse of the immigration and race issues, it was not immune to the pressures coming both within and outside the Parliament. These pressures led anti-immigrant discourse to find a place in the mainstream from the late 1970s onwards. Through the adoption of a nationalist rhetoric and promising citizens to protect them against external threats (Boswell 2003: 16), where external threats being widely defined to include immigrants and asylum-seekers, the worried public was artificially comforted. The repercussions of such rhetoric prevail also in the more recent era by influencing the political context of the immigration policy-making in the UK. Further details of the current immigration debates and policies in the UK are analysed in the fourth and fifth sections of the paper.

The Changing Political Context of Immigration Policy-Making in Italy

Unlike the UK, where political landscape's marked by a considerable stability, the post-Cold War Italian political scenery is characterised by a highly volatile and polarised political party system which influences the general frame of policy debates and policy-making.

The impact of such a political context on the national-level immigration policy-making has been the lack of sustained political efforts for the development of an all-encompassing immigration law. Immigration policy development proceeded along fractures lines as with every government change there were symbolic efforts to put aside what had been brought under the term of the previous government even though such strategic political moves did not lead to paradigmatic shifts. The extent and the weight of individual policy-makers in the design of immigration policies, who do not always have over-lapping policy priorities, also posed certain challenges to the formation of an institutionalised setting of rules and ideas that would regulate the context of immigration policy-making in Italy in a more standardised way. In the absence of such a setting, unlike in Britain where legislative proposals in any policy field would be presented as a government proposal, in Italy, legislative packages are developed on the initiative of a few leading political figures. This feature of Italian policy-making reflects itself also in the way legislative packages are named after the pioneering figures who took the initial steps leading to the proposed legislation, such as the so-called Turco-Napolitano Law (1998) and the Maroni Security package (2008).

Another factor that rendered setting the cornerstones of immigration approach in Italy a difficult task is connected to the way parties use immigration as a bargaining chip during coalition formation processes and also in their attempts to remain distinctive to their electorate. Thus, pieces of legislation come out more as the outcomes of political compromises and due to this, these policies fall short of offering long-term solutions to the serious loopholes in Italy's immigration policies, namely the politicised nature of entry quotas and irregular migration.

It should be noted that the way immigration is referred as a bargaining chip in intra-coalition and inter-party dynamics to gain an upper-hand is more common among the left-wing parties, which eventually diminishes the strength of their political positioning in the electorates' eyes. The key right-wing parties, such as the *Forza Italia* (FI, Go Italy!), the *Lega Nord* (LN, Northern League) and the *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN, National Alliance) (the party merged with the FI in 2007 under the name of the *Popolo delle Liberta'*), which appeared in

Italian politics as the new political forces in the early 1990s enjoy a relatively higher-level of unity and cohesiveness in terms of their immigration approaches. These new representatives of the right-wing politics turned immigration into a political asset to capitalise on electoral support and also re-defined the general climate of response towards immigration and immigrants in Italy by introducing a new restrictive rhetorical style starting from the 1990s. The changing dynamics of immigration rhetoric and approaches in Italy are elaborated on in the following sections of the paper.

III. IMMIGRATION TRAJECTORIES

Britain: Traditional but 'Non-Classical' Country of Immigration

Immigration is not a recent phenomenon for the UK and the country has experienced migratory inflows for centuries. Yet, unlike other European countries such as Germany, France and Belgium which initiated formal immigrant labour worker programmes in the post-World War II era, the UK never had the similar urge to officially set up labour recruitment programmes during the 1950s and the 1960s as its former colonies provided such labour force. The only exception was the introduction of the various European Voluntary Worker (EVW) schemes during the 1940s which were aimed to gather the extra labour force required by national industry in the aftermath of World War II (Geddes 1996; Somerville 2007). The economic migrants coming to the UK as part of the EVW programmes originated from the Eastern European and Baltic countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Yugoslavia. During the same era, there were also immigrant arrivals from the New Commonwealth and when the EVW schemes were put to an end in 1951, the inflows from the New Commonwealth turned into the primary means for the UK to meet its domestic labour market demands.

The open door approach towards immigration during the imminent aftermath of the Wold War II resulted in high rates of inflows from Asia and the Caribbean (Düvell, in Triandafyllidou et. al. 2007: 349). Even though immigration was not yet a high ranking political concern during the 1950s, the arrivals from the New Commonwealth had already generated concerns among British public about 'coloured' or 'black' immigration (Layton-Henry 1992; Geddes 2003: 34). Such public worries offered the ground for the introduction of restrictive immigration regulations during the 1960s and the 1970s which proved to be an electorally profitable strategy (Layton-Henry 1994; Hansen 2000).

The restrictions of the 1960s and 1970s were successful in terms of curtailing the size of primary immigration, especially from the New Commonwealth countries which were the primary targets of these control policies. Nonetheless, they were not effective either in terms of halting secondary immigration due to family re-unifications (Düvell, in Triandafyllidou et. al. 2007: 348), which led immigration rates to continue increasing (Freeman, in Messina and Lahav 2006: 151), or addressing the changing migration trajectories in the 1980s and the 1990s that led to new waves of both labour migrant and asylum-seeker arrivals.

During the 1990s, the UK continued receiving different types of migrant inflows (i.e. asylum-seekers, labour migrants, students, and the ones coming as part of family re-unification) with increased rates but it was the rising number of asylum applicants that became the centre of public and media attention (Boswell 2003). The politicised approaches towards these groups led to the growth of public suspicion that not all the asylum claimants were really in need of asylum but some were poorly skilled economic migrants making asylum claims to veil their real intention to find alternative channels to come to the UK.

Despite the narrowing down of the legal entry routes for labour migrants, many areas and industries in British economy had been suffering from labour shortages in the late 1990s (Portes, Glover et. al. 2001: 50). Such a labour market structure offered incentives for a re-consideration of policies towards foreign labour migration and a selective opening of entry channels for the skilled and the highly skilled migrants during the Labour government term in the early 2000s. With the introduction of the 'managed migration' notion in the 2002 White Paper, the differential treatment of different immigrant groups became crystallised. The evolution of this policy position towards the highly-skilled is discussed in greater detail in the next section.

Italy: Shift from a Being Country of Emigration to Immigration

During the 1950s and the 1960s, due to its economic boom, Italy started experiencing gradual increases in the numbers of immigrant arrivals (Colombo and Sciortino 2004; Einaudi 2007) which eventually led the country to experience positive immigration balance during the mid-1970s. It should also be noted that the economic down-turn in some of the European countries, such as France, Belgium and Germany, during the 1970s and the introduction of stricter immigration regimes in these countries which aimed at giving priority to domestic labour force in the face of raising unemployment rates attracted some of the migrants to Italy who were willing to arrive to Europe (Pastore 2004; Zanfrini 2007; Zincone 1995, 1998).

The initial arrivals took place in the absence of any government initiated labour migration programme. Italian émigrés returning to the motherland from northern Europe during the 1970s constituted a substantial portion of this initial wave of arrivals (Menz 2009: 232).

Table 2 **Estimates of net migration by five year intervals (in thousands)**

Italy	1950-1955	1955-1960	1960-1965	1965-1970	1970-1975	1975-1980	1980-1985
	-40	-113	-35	-39	18	44	66

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp, accessed 27 July 2010.

Even though the precise data on immigrants in Italy was non-existent during the 1960s and the 1970s, still, the economic decline that started in the late 1970s and the perceived increases in foreigners' presence in the job market, led to intensified political debates in the mid-1980s concerning labour migration regulation. The lack of an active migrant labour recruitment channel, poor internal controls and extended underground economy (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009: 127) acted as the breeding ground for irregular immigration which simply continued with increased rates for the rest of the 1980s. The rising numbers of legal and undocumented immigrants started to become one of the main elements of anti-system parties' (*Lega Nord* [Northern League], *Liga veneta* [Venetian League], *Unione piemontesia* [Piedmontese Union] etc.) political discourse in the 1980s. The use of such rhetoric by these political parties in the face of increasing immigration rates triggered hostility towards immigrants which sometimes resulted in violent attacks against them.

Starting from the early 1990s, the issue of immigrant labour regulation, the dominant concern during the late-1970s and the 1980s, took a back seat in the face of rising security concerns. The demise of the so-called iron curtain with the collapse of communism was a significant factor for the increased emphasis on immigration's security dimension in Italy. The two main issues at the core of the political discussions were the expulsion of illegally present foreigners and the provision of judicial protection against any arbitrary expulsion practice. These debates did not result only due to pressures created by the *Lega Nord* and the centre-right political parties but also by the increasing immigration rates and the reaction of the radical-left against the treatment and the expulsion of the illegally arriving immigrants

(Einaudi 2007: 139). The result was the politicisation of immigration in Italy on the basis of populist derives which blocked discussions on the very much needed integration policies.

Thus, even though Italy was a late-comer country to immigration, it was rather quick in terms of following the trend in Europe by adopting a restrictive political position towards immigration. As Zincone (1998: 76) also notes, immigration as a highly politicised issue, was started to be used by political parties for various purposes, such as 'to draw new political borders between and within parties', 'to build and destroy alliances', 'to acquire a democratic legitimisation or raise their coalition potential', and 'to strengthen their electoral appeal'. Especially populist politicians and anti-immigrant parties such as the *Lega Nord* played on public worries about immigration and promised tougher measures against undocumented entries.

Ironically, foreign population in Italy is concentrated in the Northern part of Italy, where the support for the *Lega* has been strong. This situation reveals that even though immigrants are both 'wanted' and needed in the Italian labour market and economy, they are not 'welcomed' by the society (Zolberg 1987). Both the political authorities' inability to regulate the presence of foreigners in the job market by targeting the sources of irregular migration, and also the anti-immigrant rhetoric of populist politicians and the media inflates public hostility towards immigrants by carving the path for further populist political abuses of immigration issues. Despite public-level immigration prejudices and 'illiberal' immigration approaches at political-level, the share of foreign population continues to grow in Italy.

IV. ELECTORAL POSITIONING ON HIGH-SKILLED MIGRATION

Britain: Dominantly Favourable Approaches towards the Highly Skilled Developing at the Expense of Other Categories

An overall analysis of the selected UK political parties' manifestos reveals a number of points concerning the references made to high-skilled migration in the party programmes. The detailed discussion is provided in the subsequent sections.

1997 General Elections

1997 stands out as the only year during which none of the analysed political parties reflected any opinion in their manifestos neither concerning the economic aspects of

migration, in general terms, nor high-skilled migration in particular. Instead, issues such as the human rights of immigrants, the overall functioning of the national immigration and asylum system together with the impact of immigration on the cultural, ideational, and the racial composition of Britain were addressed.

2001 General Elections

In the wake of the 2001 general election campaign, there was an increased focus on 'immigration management' that would maximise inward migration's potential economic benefits for the UK. The shift is reflected in the configuration of references made to skilled migration by the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats, albeit very timidly. The way Labour Party addressed this point was especially quite vague as the Party only noted that 'the talents of all in the society should be put into use for a healthy economy and society' (*2001 Labour Party General manifesto*: 6). Even though Barbara Roche, the then Home Secretary, boldly stated before the 2001 campaign that 'In the past we have thought purely about immigration control… Now we need to think about immigration management… The evidence shows that economically-driven migration can bring substantial overall benefits for both growth and the economy' (Roche 2000), the Labour was careful not to integrate this point into its 2001 electoral campaign.

It was the Liberal Democrats which came up with a clearer form of reference to high-skilled migration. The Party adopted a positive approach towards meeting the skills gap by importing skilled foreign labour and underlined that immigrants had an important contribution to make to British society' as there was 'shortage of skilled workers in many fields'(*Liberal Democrat General Election Manifesto 2001*: 34).

The Conservative Party and the BNP manifestos did not touch upon any issue concerning the management of high-skilled migration. All in all, during the 2001 campaign, high-skilled migration was far from being a priority issue concern for any of the analysed parties.

2005 General Elections

It was the 2005 campaign during which parties started showing sizeable interest in addressing high-skilled migration while making their points about how they perceive the economic effects of migration for the UK. The Labour Party, the Conservative Party and the

Liberal Democrats all expressed the view that Britain could benefit from immigration in economic terms and they reflected a favourable approach towards high-skilled migration.

For instance, the Labour Party in its 2005 manifesto states that 'immigration has been good for Britain' and skilled migrants have positive economic impact as they contribute '10-15 per cent' of the national economy's overall growth (*The Labour Party Manifesto 2005*: 51). Furthermore, the Party announces its plans to introduce a points-based immigration system, if it comes to power and argues that such a system would aim to attract more skilled workers to Britain who would increase the UK economy's competitiveness in the global setting. In contrast with its 1997 and 2001 election manifestos, during its 2005 campaign, the Labour shows a clear preference for skilled migrants over unskilled ones and promises that '…only skilled workers will be allowed to settle long-term in the UK, with English language tests for everyone who wants to stay permanently and an end to chain migration' (ibid.). These lines indicate that the Labour adopts a prominently economised stance on immigration by underlining that immigrant flows would be conditionally allowed depending on immigrants' potential to contribute to the country's economic growth and welfare.

The Conservative Party, while accusing the Labour for not following a responsible immigration approach and not setting limits to legal immigration, actually very much mirrors the Labour rhetoric in its 2005 campaign with its emphasis on immigration as a factor contributing to the 'economic vibrancy' in the UK (*Conservative Election Manifesto 2005*: 19) and on the necessity to actively encourage high-skilled migration through the introduction of 'points-based system for work permits similar to the one used in Australia' which will prioritise people with skills that Britain needs over those who do not have such skills (ibid.).

The Liberal Democrats also recognise migration's 'economically and culturally' positive effects, and argue that managed migration would help to 'fill the demand for skills and labour that are in short supply' in the country (*Liberal Democrats: The Real Alternative* 2005: 10-11).

Among all the analysed parties, it is the BNP which presents migration solely as a phenomenon that lowers down of the national wage levels and leaves fewer job prospects for the native labour force. The BNP proposes re-designing the British education system that would provide the needed work force to the national economy from the 'native' population instead of referring to high-skilled migration for reducing the skills gaps that exist in the UK (*British National Party General Election 2005 Manifesto, Rebuilding British Democracy*: 35-6).

In parallel with the deepening of the economic crisis that began in 2007, the favouritism for further tightening of labour migration started to become prominent in political debates. The call of Prime Minister Gordon Brown in the autumn of 2008 as 'British workers for British jobs' was one of the most striking examples of the shifting attitudes. The re-configured labour migration positions were also reflected in the changing tone of the manifestos used during the 2010 general elections. All the three political parties (i.e. the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats) that presented a favourable approach towards high-skilled migration prior to the 2010 campaign adopted tougher rhetoric with increased emphasis on the importance of controlling numbers of entries.

The Labour Party carefully distinguishes between its approach towards asylum and skilled migration. By creating a gap between the two approaches, it finds the space to argue in favour of the new 'Australian-style points-based system' which, according to the Party, is the key to ensure 'rising employment and wages, not rising immigration' (*The Labour Party Manifesto 2010: A Future Fair for All*: 5.2)

The Conservative Party continues to approach high-skilled migration positively and also presents its proposal to set limits to immigration. According to this plan, the objective would be to bring net migration to the UK to 'tens of thousands a year' instead of 'hundreds of thousands' (*Invitation to join the Government of Britain: the Conservative Manifesto 2010*: 21). In addition to the promises to limit the access of non-EU economic migrants to British labour market, Tories also claim that the student visa system needs to be tightened as it constitutes 'the biggest weakness' of the UK border controls. This rhetoric indicates an increased rigidity in the discursive elements used by Tories while addressing immigration issues.

The Liberal Democrats, moving closer to the Labour Party positioning, underlines the necessity to 'manage migration so that it benefits Britain and is fair for everyone' (*Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010*: 75). For that purpose the Party proposes 'a regional points-based system to ensure that migrants can work only where they are needed' (ibid.). Different from the previous elections, the 2010 LibDem manifesto also shows some orientation towards a control-based immigration approach as it is stated that immigration system should be enforced 'through rigorous checks on businesses' and 'rogue employers who profit from illegal labour' should be cracked down (ibid.: 75-76)

The BNP does not modify its immigration position and continues to present it as a factor leading to fewer jobs for British workers (*Democracy, Freedom, Culture and Identity: British National Party General Election Manifesto 2010*: 19), undermining wages together with productivity (ibid.: 79), and creating an extra economic burden for the UK without making any distinction among different worker categories (i.e. unskilled, skilled and high-skilled). The Party approaches immigration only within the frame of increased numbers of 'cheap labour' in the UK without touching upon any point related to high-skilled migration and its effects on British economy.

Italy: High-Skilled Migration References as the Distant Echo Generated by Some Limited Circles

The overall analyses of the individual parties' and election coalitions' manifestos reveal that references to the economic impact of inward migration to Italy is not among the priority concerns of the key political actors. Instead, immigration topics are pre-dominantly referred to attack policies and positions of political opponents in this realm, to reflect concerns about the functioning of immigration and asylum systems, and to underline the human rights dimension of immigration, a point mostly made in the manifestos used by the left-wing parties. Therefore, immigration is not approached in terms of its tangible effects on Italian economy but it is placed within a politicised frame. Even though the influence of immigration on Italian economy is not a priority concern either for the Left or for the Right, the left-wing parties pay a relatively higher-level of attention to the issue than the right-wing ones. A more detailed analysis of the results is presented below.

1996 General Elections

In 1996, it is the right-wing *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN, National Alliance) and the centre-left *Ulivo* (Olive Tree) coalition that refer to economic migration, albeit quite differently.

While the AN was part of the right-wing *Polo per le Liberta'* (Pole for the Liberty) coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi during the 1996 elections, it still issued an individual political programme in addition to the coalition manifesto. In this separate manifesto, the AN argued that the flux of labour migration drives both the risk of increased unemployment among native population, especially those working in sectors which are already in crisis

(without mentioning what these economic sectors are), and lead to increased public worries that are sometimes translated into 'xenophobic and racist reactions' (*Alleanze Nazionale* 1996, *Pensiamo L'Italia Il Domani C'E' Gia'*: 73). Thus, the Party downplayed the source of social unrests to increasing numbers of labour migrants without referring to the responsibility of political authorities for managing of economic migration and soothing public worries.

The *Ulivo*, the left-wing electoral coalition that was formed in the aftermath of the 1994 elections and headed by Romano Prodi, on the contrary, emphasised immigrant entrepreneurs' contribution to the Italian economy by generating new jobs (*Ulivo* 1996, *Riforma delle Istituzioni e dello Stato*: 67). This was the only reference made by the centre-left coalition to labour migration in its electoral programme.

2001 General Elections

The 2001 general elections in Italy presented a more balanced picture in terms of the diversity of political parties reflecting their views on the economic effects of migration. These were the right-wing electoral coalition *Casa delle Liberta'* (CdL, House of Liberties), the centre-left *Ulivo* coalition, and the radical left *Rifondazione Comunista* (RC, Reformed Communists) which used to be one of the *Ulivo* components during the 1996 elections.

The House of Liberties (CdL) coalition was composed of parties having both strict (xenophobic Northern League, post-fascist National Alliance) and moderate (Forza Italia; *Unione dei Democratici Cristiani* (UDC; Union of Democratic Christians)) immigration positions. Despite this diversity among its components, the coalition adopted a favourable approach towards labour migration and argued that those who would like to come to Italy to work and to contribute to its economy should be welcomed (*Casa delle Liberta'* 2001, *Piano di Governo per Una Intera Legislatura*:7). Such a positioning of the CdL is not difficult to understand as part of the electoral support base of the parties composing it involved business elites. Thus, even the far-right *Lega Nord* and the *Alleanza Nazionale* proved remarkable acquiescent to pragmatic labour migration positioning given the importance of both the foreign domestic aides for the households of its northern bourgeois voters (Menz 2009: 235) and the foreign labour force on which the industries in Northern Italy depend.

During the 2001 campaign, both the Left and the centre-left positively approached economic migration to Italy. The centre-left achieved further sophistication in its immigration rhetoric than the Left by distinguishing among different categories of migrants (i.e. labour migrants, asylum-seekers) coming to Italy. It also identified different groups composing

economic migration, such as un-skilled, low-skilled, and high-skilled migrants. While the coalition argued that labour migration policies should be shaped on the basis of supply-demand dynamics where social partners, local institutions and regional authorities would provide their opinion, it adopted a particularly favourable stance towards high-skilled migration. For instance, it stated that research centres in Italy should aim to attract the 'best foreign researchers' (*Ulivo* 2001, *Rinnoviamo L'Italia, insieme: Il programma dell'Ulivo per il governo 2001-06*: 96).

The far-left, on the other hand, had a more holistic approach towards immigration and as the *Rifondazione Comunista* put forward in its manifesto, it took this phenomenon as a political reality and also as a factor contributing to the national economy. Another point it underlined was that immigration should be approached with 'openness', yet, it did not distinguish between different categories of economic migrants (*Rifondazione Comunista* 2001, *Un voto Utile per Il Paese per Costruire Una Sinistra di Alternativa e Una Sinistra Plurale*: 89)

2006 General Elections

In 2006, only the left-wing *Unione* (Union) coalition, which was one of the two election coalitions together with the right-wing House of Liberties (CdL) that competed in the elections of that year, refers to the economic effects of migration. All of the coalition references pointed out immigrants' positive contributions to the economic life in Italy. Most of the *Unione* references to economic migration were related to the impact of un-skilled and low-skilled migrants in Italy but high-skilled migration was also highlighted as a 'precious resource' for Italy to cope with the skills gap that cannot be filled-in by native labour force (*Unione* 2006, *Per Il Bene del Italia: Programma di Governo 2006-2011*: 249). While the *Unione* coalition argued that there should be special policies to attract high-skilled migration to Italy, it also acknowledged foreign students as a separate category and campaigned for the introduction of policies that would bring increased numbers of foreign students to Italian universities (ibid.: 253).

2008 General Elections

Similar to the 2006 general elections, during the 2008 campaign, economic effects of immigration to Italy were addressed solely by the political Left. The parties whose manifestos

included relevant statements were the *Partito Democratico* (PD, Democratic Party) and the *Sinistra Arcobaleno* (SA, Rainbow Left). The PD was a party formed just in the wake of the 2008 elections with the merger of two political parties coming from the centre-left (i.e. *Margherita*) and the communist traditions (*Democratici di Sinistra* (DS), Left Democrats) (Newell 2010). The SA, was an election coalition standing to the left of the PD in the political spectrum.

The positions of the PD and the SA concerning the economic impacts of inward migration to Italy overlap to a great extent. The PD underlines that immigration is an opportunity not a threat thus it should not be suppressed but managed in order to avoid the victimisation of immigrants (*Partito Democratico* 2008, *L'Italia Nel Mondo Che Cambia*: 17). Furthermore, according to the PD, migration policies should be re-designed to encourage the entry of highly skilled immigrants (ibid.: 17). The importance of high-skilled migration is touched upon also within the specific frame of the situation of academia in Italy and how foreign researchers and professors would contribute to raise the profile of Italian universities world-wide (ibid.: 21).

The SA's immigration position is shaped by a rights-based point of view referring to immigrants as 'indispensible workers' in Italian society who 'are excluded from having access to a lot of rights' (*Sinistra Arcobaleno* 2008, *Il Programma della Sinistra Arcobaleno*: 4). While the positive economic effects of immigrants in Italy are highlighted by pointing out their contributions to gross national product and also the taxes they pay (ibid.), the party does not particularly refer to any issue connected to high-skilled migration.

V. POLICIES ON HIGH-SKILLED MIGRATION (1996-2010)

UK: Consistency between Mainstream Rhetoric and Practice

In the UK, the 1997-2010 period witnessed, on the one hand, the introduction of further restrictions and punitive measures concerning the treatment and accommodation of asylum-seekers, and on the other hand, the development of a relatively liberal labour migration approach as motivated by 'competition state prerogatives of securing national competitiveness' (Menz 2009: 156).

The Thatcherite economic policies in the 1980s sowed the seeds of the human resource strategies of the 1990s marked by an open approach towards importing skilled immigrant labour in the services and public sectors (ibid.: 157). Yet, it was the political

authorities' positively changing approach towards labour migration in the late 1990s that put the existence of such incentive structures into active use.

Following the Labour Party's election to government in 1997 the UK labour migration policies gradually started to change. While the Party projected a 'progressive, modernising and reforming' self-image (Hay 1999; Finlayson 2003) during its 1997 campaign, following its election to the government it adopted a cautious approach on immigration issues. This cautious approach was in a way the verification of what the then Shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw famously said in the run-up to the 1997 election as 'you couldn't get a cigarette paper between Labour and the Tories over the question of immigration' (The *Guardian* 3 March 1995, quoted in Balch 2010: 123).

The process that laid the background to the policy shift in the early 2000s was triggered in late 1998 with the creation of a research programme to 'modernise' the work permit system and 'the cabinet-level led review of the work permit system' in 1999 (Steve Lamb, Deputy Director, Work Permits UK, quoted in Balch 2010: 126). This shift of the focus from restriction on asylum policy to maximise the potential benefits of labour migration for the UK led to the introduction of the 'managed migration' framework in 2001, a year which also marked the Labour's second term in the government. Managed migration approach further deepened the gap between the treatment of the 'desired' labour migration that would bring the skills in short supply in the UK, and the 'unwanted' asylum-seeker inflows.[2]

In the 2002 White Paper, *Secure Borders, Safe Havens: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain*, the Labour Government aimed at bringing some concrete substance into 'managed migration' framework. 'Managing migration' was defined as: 'having an orderly, organised and enforceable system of entry. It also meant managing post-entry integration and inclusion in the members of the existing population to welcome them into their communities' (HMSO 2002, paragraph 1.3). The document on the one hand had emphasis on control and enforcement, and on the other hand, it underlined British economy's need for both high- and low-skilled migration.

The British government's approach towards the 2004 EU enlargement was also defined under the light of such a deliberate policy strategy based on 'attracting migrants to segments of the labour market that current residents either cannot fill due to a skills mismatch or are not prepared to due to the working conditions and wage levels' (Menz 2009: 154). As an extension of this policy approach, the UK was one of the three countries which did not

---

[2] As Balch (2010) notes, while it is difficult to keep a track of the origins of the term 'managed migration', Stephen Boys- Smith, secretary general of the IND (1998-2002) is seen as the one who first introduced it.

impose any transitionary arrangements on the new EU members (Ireland and Sweden were the other two).

Nevertheless, the large-scale immigration triggered by the 2004 EU enlargement led to increased public worries about immigration which were translated into public and political pressures on the government. These worries increased with the outbreak of the so-called 'foreign prisoners scandal' which revealed that foreign nationals who had been convicted of crime were released without procession for deportation by the UK immigration service (Menz 2009: 136). The heightened immigration concerns resulted in the re-definition of the rhetorical elements used while addressing immigration. For instance, the Home Secretary, John Reid, stated that 'I don't believe in the free movement of labour: I believe the situation should be managed. You hear the same from ethnic minorities. There's nothing racist about it'.[3]

Such concerns related to the increased labour migration inflows following the 2004 enlargement played a role in pushing the Labour government to go public on the 'complete overhaul' of the managed migration system' (Menz 2009: 135). The Labour government's decision was motivated by the 'exigencies of the political cycle' (Salt 2005: 92), as the 2005 general election was in the horizon and the promise of stricter immigration controls was already part of the Conservative Party campaign rhetoric.

The Labour Party government's decision against the free movement of workers from Rumania and Bulgaria following their inclusion to the EU 'club' in 2007 also developed under electoral pressures as the Labour was seeking to enhance its political support base at the expense of the new Tory leader David Cameron. The decision to limit work permits for arrivals from Romania and Bulgaria was only a strategic move as the government did not go through any radical shifts in its managed migration agenda which had gained a new level of concreteness with the introduction of the points-based system in 2006.

The points-based system was designed as one of the three main strategies to enhance the benefits of economic migration for the UK, together with the expansion of the work permit system (Grice and Morris 2006), and the development of two main schemes under the names of 'Innovators Scheme' and 'Highly Skilled Migrants Programme'.

The points-based immigration system provided 'a greater number of policy levers', for instance by 'changing the way points are calculated and raising the points needed to qualify', to 'target migrant groups' in general, and particularly to determine those who had

---

[3] Available at http://www.workers.org.uk/features/feat_1006/migrant.html, accessed 12 April 2011.

qualifications to be considered within the frame of the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (Balch 2010: 139). It also provided the rhetorical ground to the Labour government to sooth public concerns by underlining that only those with skills will be allowed to come to the UK.

With the deepening of the economic crisis, the emphasis in political debates on the necessity for further restrictions on third-country nationals' labour migration increased which led to the introduction of tighter rules and regulations. For example, beginning in January 2009, employers had to post job openings in the government's Jobcentre Plus (Labour Employment Agency) before advertising vacancies in non-EU countries. Furthermore, the Labour government introduced a 50 £ fee in March 2009 on non-EU migrant workers and students to raise 15 million pounds a year to help local communities cover costs associated with migrants (Migration News, April 2009). As a response to deteriorating economy, the government set new conditions for migrants who would apply to skilled jobs which required them 'to have at least a master's degree and a previous salary equivalent to at least 20,000 pounds' (BBC 2009).

Italy: Lack of Rhetorical References Matching with the Absence of Policy Schemes

As pre-mentioned, initial waves of immigrant arrivals in Italy were not addressed through any concretely structured national-level control mechanism. Introduction of annual labour migration quotas goes only back to the 1990 Law, which came out as a policy response to the calls made by the Italian business elites in favour of the initiation of an active labour migration management scheme (Menz 2009: 233).[4]

Another important point is that independent from whether the government has a right or left-wing orientation, the main contours of immigration policy remained largely unchanged in Italy (ibid.: 235). Even though the Right has adopted a more restrictive position on immigration, especially in rhetorical terms, in practice it never pursued a zero-immigration policy. While the Right is concerned about protecting the interests of the business clientele that forms part of its electoral support base, thus silently recognising the country's reliance on labour migrants, Italy's long coastal line poses challenges against the establishment of full control on external borders and renders such zero-immigration policy goals fairly unrealistic.

---

[4] The 1990 Law is also known as the Martelli Law due to the key role played by Claudio Martelli, the Deputy Prime Minister who was responsible for immigration policies at the time (Zincone 1995: 140). While the 1990 Martelli law was the first Italian legislation aiming at developing a comprehensive response to the challenges of migration and asylum (Papademetriou and Hamilton 1996: 48), it did not bring any effective changes to the legal framework which would have addressed the root causes of illegal entries and irregular migration (Colombo and Sciortino 2004; Reyneri 1998).

Even the far-right *Lega Nord* and the *Alleanza Nazionale* did not adopt positions against pragmatic labour migration regulations (ibid.: 235). Linking this point to the manifesto analysis, even though parties of the Left appear to reflect more favourable approaches towards immigration at the rhetorical-level and praise the potential benefits of high-skilled migration to Italy, when it comes to practice, the policies they pursue do not dramatically differ from those followed by the centre-right.

The relatively low skilled workers 'with no prior experience' are still the mostly demanded category in many job sectors in Italy, comprising almost half of the total migrant labour category sought by different employment sectors (Chaloff 2005: 11). In the past, some specific sub-categories for the employment of high-skilled immigrants were occasionally introduced such as the ones applying to nurses and information technology workers in 2001 and high-level management employees during the period of 2002-2004. Yet, the quota for highly skilled managers or executives, and IT professionals is suspended since 2006 (Menz 2009: 236).

In addition to these categories, some other groups that were given special consideration involved university professors and researchers, certified translators and interpreters, domestic aides and au pairs, trainees, language teachers, sailors, athletes, artists, temporarily posted workers, and accredited foreign journalists (Chaloff 2005: 14).

Nonetheless, current Italian migration policies are mainly concerned about suppressing undocumented entries and supplying extra low-skilled foreign labour force to Italian enterprises whom would preferably 'have participated in Italian-sponsored training courses in their home country' (ibid.: 15). As a result of this approach, in Italy, there is not any specific programme for the active recruitment of highly skilled migrants, such as the High Skilled Migrants Programme (HSMP) of the UK that targets groups such as doctors, engineers, IT specialists and finance experts (Geddes 2005: 16).

Conclusion

The article concentrates on the era following the end of the actively solicited labour migration policies nearly in all of the EU member states. While the increasingly politicised discussions on migration laid down unfavourable conditions for any real renaissance of labour migration in Europe, despite this unfavourable rhetorical context, there is a selective liberalisation of labour migration policies in different parts of Europe. In other terms, despite the absence of a 'free-for-all' approach towards labour migration, the rhetorical claims about

global battle for brains paved the way for liberalised managed migration. Concerning the development of debates and approaches towards high-skilled migration, the comparison of Britain and Italy reveals that it is a policy field involving both state and non-state actors where the former is usually quite receptive to the claims generated by the latter and sometimes takes these claims at face value without having much discussion on the details. Yet, even though the business elite interests favouring an active promotion of high-skilled migration might be necessary to generate a certain amount of willingness at the decision-making level to re-visit labour migration and its particular aspects, it may not be sufficient on its own. For instance, in the UK, despite the calls in the early 1990s for the adoption of more pro-labour policies, such business demands started to resonate at the political-level only during the late 1990s-early 2000s. Thus, the role of the political leadership and its approach towards labour migration determines whether or not specific schemes for the highly skilled would be developed. Once the political authorities showed enthusiasm to set the necessary schemes by making the UK the first country in Europe to adopt Australian-style migration policies, there was not much need for the employers to push too strongly for the liberalisation of approaches towards skilled migration. Hence, while the public and business pressures can provide the tapping effect, it is the political elites that drive the process. With their central role, political elites are also able to exert influence on public opinion through (re)-configurations of the way they turn their communicative discourse into coordinative discourse and spread their policy ideas and programmes. They also define the channels through which business elites could convey their voices to policy-making circles.

The overall results of the analysis indicate that in Italy, a mixed market economy with its slightly more mixed and difficult to classify economic structures where employers adopt relatively more divided positions on the types of labour migration to be favoured, the key political parties do not yet deem the initiation of a high-skilled migration scheme as a priority. Even though the centre-left and the centre-right have occasionally been referring to the potential benefits of the high-skilled migration, these ideas and debates have not successfully led to a special framework similar to the one that was set up in the UK. Hence, when compared with a liberal market economy such as the UK, in Italy, employers' associations are a lot less active and successful in shaping labour migration policies.

On the contrary, in the UK, the long history of the encounters with migratory inflows led debates on various different aspects of immigration, including high-skilled immigration, to flourish at an earlier stage than they did in Italy. This appears to influence the political psyche by laying the suitable ground for approaching immigration as a permanent phenomenon and

also the development of strategies to maximise the 'utility' of immigration for the country. The policy objective to maximise the benefits of immigration eventually led to the development of a highly skilled migrants' scheme. While the UK mainstream political parties approach high-skilled migration as a necessary project and their policy approaches indicate parallelism with their discourse to a great extent, in Italy, parties of the centre-left and the centre-right are still in the course of politically digesting the idea that Italy has become a country of immigration. Furthermore, the problem of ever-increasing number of irregular migrants is a highly pressing issue in Italy, which causes public to worry and feel insecure. Thus, announcing a new scheme which would initiate a process of enhanced, state-supported foreign labour recruitment is not regarded as a politically affordable strategy by any of the key political parties. Yet, under the pressing demographic and economic needs, similar to the experience in the UK, political elites in Italy may also seek to selectively securitise and economise their approach towards different migrant groups; a rhetorical tactic which is already employed by the centre-left and the centre-right in their electoral positioning, though not fully articulated.

REFERENCES

Abella, Manolo, and Geoffrey Ducanes. 2009. "The Effect of the Global Economic Crisis on Asian Migrant Workers and Governments' Responses", *ILO Regional Office Paper*.

Ambrosini, Maurizio. 2008. "Italy." In *Migration and Labour Markets in Selected Regions of the European Union*, ed. The European Centre for Workers' Questions. Aachen: Shaker Verlag.

Balch, Alex. 2010. *Managing labour migration in Europe: Ideas, knowledge and policy change*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

BBC. 2009. "Migrants face tighter work rules." *BBC News*, 22 February 2009.

Berman, Sheri. 1998. *The Social Democratic Movement: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Berman, Sheri. 2006. *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Blyth, Mark M. 1997. "Any More Bright Ideas? The Ideational Turn in Comparative Political Economy." *Comparative Politics* 29 (2): 229–50.

Blyth, Mark M. 2002. *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Boswell, Christina. 2003. *European Migration Policies in Influx: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion*. Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Blackwell Publishing.

Cerna, Lucie, and William Hynes. 2009. "Globalisation Backlash? The Influence of Global Governance in Trade and Immigration." Oxford: *COMPAS Working Paper* No. 74.

Chaloff, Jonathan. 2005. "Italy." In *Immigration as a labour market strategy- European and North American Perspectives*, eds. Jan Niessen and Yongmi Schibel. Migration Policy Group Research Report.

Cocker, Phil and Alistair Jones. 2002. *Contemporary British Politics and Government*. Third Edition. Wirral: Liverpool Academic Press.

Coleman, David. 1994. "The United Kingdom and International Migration: A Changing Balance." In *European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century: Historical Pattern, Actual Trends, and Social Implications*, eds. Heinz Fassman and Rainer Münz. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Colombo, Asher and Giuseppe Sciortino. 2004. *Gli Immigrati in Italia*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Cornelius, Wayne A., Philip L. Martin and James F. Hollifield (eds). 1994. *Controlling Immigration: A global perspective.. Stanford: Stanford University Press.*

Cotta, Maurizio and Luca Verzichelli. 2007. *Political Institutions in Italy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Düvell, Franck. 2007. "United Kingdom." In *European Immigration: A Sourcebook*, eds. Anna Triandafyllidou and Ruby Gropas. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Einaudi, Luca. 2007. *Le politiche dell'immigrazione in Italia dall'Unita a oggi*. Bari: Laterza & Figli Spa.

Finlayson, Alan. 2003. *Making Sense of New Labour*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Finotelli, Claudia and Giuseppe Sciortino. 2009. "The Importance of Being Southern: The Making of Policies of Immigration Control in Italy." *European Journal of Migration and Law* 11: 119-138.

Freeman, Gary P. 1992. "The Consequences of Immigration Policies for Immigrants Status: A British and French Comparison." In *Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, eds. Anthony M. Messina, Luis F. Fraga, Laurie A. Rhodebeck and Frederick D. Wright. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Freeman, Gary P. 2006. "Immigrant Labour and Working-Class Politics: The French and British Experince." In *The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies*, eds. Anthony M. Messina and Galya Lahav. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Geddes, Andrew. 1996. *The Politics of Immigration and Race*. Manchester: Baseline Book Company.

Geddes, Andrew. 2003. *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*. New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

Geddes, Andrew. 2005. "United Kingdom." In *Immigration as a labour market strategy- European and North American Perspectives*, eds. Jan Niessen and Yongmi Schibel. Migration Policy Group Research Report.

Geddes, Andrew, and Virginie Guiraudon. 2004. "Britain, France, and EU Anti-Discrimination Policy: The Emergence of a European Policy Paradigm." *West European Politics* 27 (2): 334-353.

Grice, Andrew, and Nigel Morris. 2006. "Last chance for Home Office as Reid announces major changes." *The Independent*, 19 July, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/last-chance-for-home-office-as-reid-announces-major-changes-408498.html, accessed on 18 July 2011.

Hansen, Randall. 2000. *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hatton, Timothy J. and Stephen Wheatley Price. 2005. "Migration, Migrants, and Policy in the United Kingdom." In *European Migration: What do We Know?*, ed. Klaus F. Zimmermann. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hay, Colin. 1999. *The Political Economy of New Labour*. Manchester: University Press.

Hay, Colin, and Ben Rosamond. 2002. "Globalisation, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives." *Journal of European Public Policy* 9 (2):147–67.

HMSO. 2002. *Secure Borders, Safe Haven- Integration with Diversity*. London: Home Office.

Ieraci, Giuseppe. 2008. *Governments and Parties in Italy: Parliamentary Debates, Investiture Votes and Policy Positions (1994-2006)*. Leicester: Troubador Publishing Ltd.

Layton-Henry, Zig. 1992. *The Politics of Immigration: Immigration, 'Race' and 'Race' Relations in Post-war Britain*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Layton-Henry, Zig. 1994. "Britain: The Would-be Zero-Immigration Country." In *Controlling Immigration: A global perspective*, eds. Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin and James F. Hollifield. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Leach, Robert. 1995. "The Political Context." In *Policy-making in Britain*, ed. Maurice Mullard. London and New York: Routledge.

Lowell, Lindsay B. 2005. "Policies and regulations for managing skilled international migration for work." *United Nations, Mortality and Migration Section of the Population Division/DESA*, New York.

Martiniello, Marco. 1992. "Italy: The Late Discovery of Immigration." In *Europe - A New Immigration Continent: Policies and Politics in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Diethrich Thraenhardt. Hamburg: Lit.

Menz, Georg. 2009. *The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate Actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Migration News. 2009. UC Davis, April 2009 16(2), http://migration.ucdavis.edu.

Papademetriou, Demetrious G., and Kimberly A. Hamilton. 1996. *Converging Paths to Restriction: French, Italian and British Responses to Immigration*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Pastore, Ferruccio. 2004. "A community out of balance: nationality law and migration politics in the history of post-unification Italy." *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 9(1): 27-48.

Portes, Jonathan, Stephen Glover et al.2001. *Migration: An Economic and Social Analysis*. RDS 67. London: Home Office.

Reyneri, Emilio. 1998. "Addressing the Employment of Migrants in an Irregular Situation." Paper presented at *the Technical Symposium on International Migration and Development*. The Hague.

Roche, Barbara, MP. 2000. "UK Migration in a Global Economy." *Presentation to the Institution for Public Policy Research (IPPR) Event*. 11 September.

Salt, John. 2005. *International Migration and the UK: Report of the UK Sopemi Correspondent, 2005*. London: OECD.

Schmidt, Vivien A., and Claudio M. Radaelli. 2004. " Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues." *West European Politics* 27 (2): 183-210.

Schmidt, Vivien A. 2008. "The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11: 303- 26.

Smith, Julie. 2008. "Towards consensus? Centre-right parties and immigration policy in the UK and Ireland." *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(3):415- 431.

Somerville, Will. 2007. *Immigration under New Labour*. Bristol: The Policy Press.

Statham, Paul and Andrew Geddes. 2006. "Elites and the 'organised public': Who drives British immigration politics and in which direction?" *West European Politics* 29 (2):248-269.

Zanfrini, Laura. 2007. *From a Source to a Destination Country of Migration*, available at www.migrationeducation.org/38.0.html, last accessed on 18 July 2010.

Zincone, Giovanna, and Tiziana Caponio. 2005. "Immigrant and immigration policy-making: The case of Italy." *IMISCOE Working Paper: Country report*.

Zincone, Giovanna. 1995. "Immigration to Italy: Data and Policies." In *Migration Policies: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. Friedrich Heckmann and Wolfgang Bosswick. Stuttgart: Euke.

Zincone, Giovanna. 1998. "Illegality, Enlightenment and Ambiguity: A Hot Italian Recipe." *South European Society and Politics* 3(3): 45-82.

Zolberg, Aristide. 1987. "Wanted but not welcome: alien labour in Western development." In *Population in an Interacting World*. William Alonso. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

List of manifestos and immigration legislation not included. Translations of Italian documents are mine.

Institute of Public Affairs
00-031 Warsaw, Poland, Szpitalna 5 / 22
tel. +48 22 55 64 260; fax +48 22 55 64 262
e-mail: isp@isp.org.pl, www.isp.org.pl