

RESEARCH

REPORTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

AGNIESZKA ŁADA, KATRIN BÖTTGER (eds.)

#EnagEUkraine

– CIVIC ACTIVITY OF UKRAINIANS IN POLAND AND GERMANY

SUMMARY

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#EnagEUkraine
– CIVIC ACTIVITY
OF UKRAINIANS IN POLAND
AND GERMANY

INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS European Programme

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
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Since 2013, the EU and its member states have had to face the new challenge of how to proceed with support for the further democratization of Ukraine. One of the more pertinent tasks was to understand in what way Ukrainian institutions and citizens should be assisted in their desire to embark on a European path of development as confirmed by the Euromaidan protest movement. In this context, the role of Ukrainian citizens residing abroad permanently or temporarily should not be underestimated. It is important to emphasize that when one is talking about the Ukrainian community abroad (traditionally referred to as the Ukrainian “diaspora”), one has to keep in mind that Ukrainians do not constitute a homogenous group. Among Ukrainians living outside their home country one can find individuals who are socially and politically active trying to support the transformation of their homeland. Among the examples of such support provided by the activists, one usually finds humanitarian aid and representation of the Ukrainian point of view through various media channels. At the same time, it is possible to find many people who are less active in a more traditional understanding, but are trying to get involved in support for Ukraine through their presence on social media platforms. Research conducted by Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) and Institut für Europäische Politik (IeP) shows clearly that Ukrainian citizens residing abroad should not only be regarded as a reservoir of human capital for their country, but also as a useful ally of Polish and German authorities who have already demonstrated their political will to promote European values in the countries formerly under Soviet control. It is important, however, to emphasize that proper co-operation with the Ukrainian diaspora requires not only a deeper understanding of the nature of their activity, self-organization and needs, but also should take into account the opportunities these individuals can offer for the development of their country.

The presented research brings us a step closer to a more comprehensive understanding of the civic activity of the Ukrainian communities in Poland and Germany. In view of the important observations described above, the Institute of Public Affairs and Institute for European Politics decided to conduct a joint research pertaining to the civic activity of Ukrainians in the post-Euromaidan period. Both research institutions are closely following the democratization process in Ukraine, hence the decision to analyze the civic activity of Ukrainians abroad came as a natural product of their previous attempts to support the country in the transformation process. In addition, ever since the Euromaidan, Poland and Germany have been a desirable destinations for Ukrainian migrants who come in search for employment or educational opportunities. Furthermore, the Polish and German governments

have shown significant political will to resolve the Russia-Ukraine military conflict and make a tangible impact on the EU's foreign policy attempts to reach a peaceful agreement in this difficult situation.

Taking these considerations into account, it is possible to argue that Ukrainians residing in Poland and Germany might be interested in influencing how the governments of the host countries respond to the challenges facing their home country. The results of the research and the recommendations that have been formulated at the end of the research are appropriate not only for readers in Poland and Ukraine, but will also be a useful source of information for a broader European audience.

Research goals

The overarching research goal was to present the various forms of engagement of Ukrainian citizens residing abroad – their self-organization and co-operation – and to analyze their motivation to act whilst residing abroad. Moreover, an analysis of the challenges related to civic activity constituted an important part of the research. The conclusions and recommendations prepared by the researchers show not only how Ukrainians can proceed with the professionalization of their activity abroad, but also describe how the governments of Poland, Germany and Ukraine, as well as the EU, can support the process of the formalization of civic activity, which is often directed at support for the Europeanization and democratization of Ukraine.

Methodology and terminology

In total, 88 in-depth semi-structured interviews (44 interviews per country) have been conducted in Poland and Germany with Ukrainian activists (32 individuals per country) and experts (12 per country). Among experts, one will find individuals who have cooperated with Ukrainian organizations in a professional capacity and have acquired understanding about the nature of the civic activity of the Ukrainian community. Respondents regarded as experts in the research include scientists, journalists, religious leaders, NGO leaders, public officials and Polish and German politicians. Respondents regarded as activists in the research comprised representatives of the Ukrainian communities who are involved in individual, informal and formal activities (usually as members of NGOs, religious and public institutions). In Poland, interviews were conducted from August to November 2015, in Germany – from July to October 2015. All interviews were recorded and then analyzed through application of qualitative methods of analysis.

During the preparatory stage, researchers endeavored to ensure the heterogeneity of respondents in order to reflect the real nature of civic activity in both countries. One of the goals was to make sure that the analysis includes

as many migrant organizations as possible from a variety of areas. Based on desk research, the first organizations whose activity involved Ukraine were identified. The second stage of the research involved snowballing methodology. Respondents who participated in the research came not only from the capitals (Warsaw and Berlin) but also from other parts of the countries to ensure proper regional representation of the sample. In Poland, researchers visited Warsaw, Lublin, Rzeszów, Przemyśl, Olsztyn, Gdańsk, Wrocław and Elbląg. In the case of Germany, interviews were conducted in northern, southern, eastern and western regions (in German - *Länder*) of the country. Among respondents, one will find individuals who were active before the Euromaidan events as well as those who started to be more engaged in Ukrainian affairs after 2013, the subsequent military conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimean peninsula.

It should be noted that the described research is not representative; therefore one can make only general observations about the nature of the civic activity of Ukrainians in Poland and Germany from the available findings. The findings did, however, allow the researchers to trace the general tendencies of activity and better understand the motivations of the members of the Ukrainian community. Based on the available data, the research team formulated a set of recommendations that would help improve the conditions (environment) for civic activity in the short-term perspective. The full version of the research has been published in the Polish and German languages and made available in printed and electronic forms in Poland ¹.

It is important to mention that the respondents who participated in the research in many cases preferred to call themselves migrants. To describe this group of respondents researchers have used the terms *old migrants/old wave of migration* (those who came prior to 2013) and *new migrants/new wave of migration* (post 2013). In the description of the research and its analysis one will come across the term *minority community*, which is used to describe citizens in Poland of Ukrainian origin who are officially recognized as a minority group in the country and usually conduct their activities within the framework of the Association of Ukrainians in Poland (in Polish – Związek Ukraińców w Polsce). In the case of Polish respondents, the term *diaspora* has been purposefully omitted because none of the groups of Ukrainian respondents have shown strong identification with it. Members of the Ukrainian minority in Poland have ascribed this phenomenon to their historical presence (the question of historical land) on the territory of modern Poland. When it comes to the description of both groups, such terms as *Ukrainian community* and *Ukrainian activists* were being used interchangeably.

1 Agnieszka Łada and Katrin Böttger, eds., #EngagEUkraine. Zaangażowanie społeczne Ukraińców w Polsce i w Niemczech. Katrin Böttger and Agnieszka Łada, eds., #EngageEUkraine – Engagement der Ukrainer in Polen und Deutschland” (Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Maj 2016). Polish version: <http://www.isp.org.pl/publikacje,1,896.html>. German version: <http://iep-berlin.de/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/EngagEUkraine.-Engagement-der-Ukrainer-in-Polen-und-Deutschland>.

In the case of Germany, the term *diaspora* is being used only when researchers refer to the entire Ukrainian diaspora in Germany. Additionally, the term *old diaspora* is used to describe those members of the diaspora who have relatively strong attachment to it. These individuals are usually Ukrainians who have resided in Germany for several generations and meet some of the requirements ascribed to the concept of *diaspora*.² However, to reflect the specificity of Ukrainian activity in Germany, the term *diasporic community* has been introduced. This decision was made to describe those individuals who did not have a strong attachment to the terms *old diaspora* or *diaspora*. By *diasporic community* one should understand those Ukrainians who, starting from November 2013 (or at some point during the post-Euromaidan period), have actively engaged in activities in support of their homeland.

2 The traditional definition of diaspora encompasses such criteria as country of origin, collective memory and the existence over several generations.

Civic activity of Ukrainians in Poland and Germany: main observations



One can find many similarities in civic activity of the Ukrainians in Poland and Germany who are eager to support their country in the post-Euromaidan period of transformation. The differences were, to a great extent, due to the different levels of integration into the host communities, geographical and cultural proximity, and the specific policies of Poland and Germany geared towards the Ukrainian citizens on their territories. The differences were also partially dependent on the different understandings of the Russia-Ukraine military conflict in the Polish and German societies.

Citizens of Poland saw the Russian Federation as the aggressor in the conflict from the very beginning, whilst in the case of German citizens, the view on who should be held responsible was more divided. In 2015, the Institute of Public Affairs and Bertelsmann Stiftung conducted a study which showed that a majority of Poles (61%) were confident that the Russian Federation should be held accountable for the events in the Eastern Ukraine³, whilst in Germany an equal percentage of respondents (43% for each group) held both Russia and Ukraine responsible for the escalation of the military conflict. It should be noted that at the time of the research pertaining to civic activity, the attitude of Polish society toward Ukrainians (both migrants and the local minority) was overall quite positive and noticeably better than in Germany, although, certainly, some part of Polish society to this very day holds a skeptical view toward the activity of Ukrainians on the territory of their country due to complicated historical legacy of the relations between Poland and Ukraine. In the case of Germany, the biggest challenge Ukrainians face is due to the general low level of knowledge about Ukraine and a lack of interest among the members of the German society in regard to the events in that country.

It is important to mention yet again that the non-representative character of the research has allowed researchers to describe only the general traits of the civic activity of Ukrainians. The results, however, make it possible to compare the nature of the civic activity in Poland and Germany and better understand the similarities and differences of their engagement as well as the motivations of various individuals, their self-organization and relations with one another.

3 Jacek Kucharczyk, Agnieszka Łada, Łukasz Wenerski (2015. Razem czy osobno? Polacy, Niemcy i Rosjanie o kryzysie rosyjsko-ukraińskim. Instytut Spraw Publicznych

Motivations of activists and the goals of their civic activity

Ukrainians in Germany and Poland share similar goals as regards their civic activity in support of the democratization of their home country. Their shared goals primarily include solidarity, the desire for peace and freedom in Ukraine, support for the European aspirations of Ukraine, and protection of its political and economic integrity.

In the period preceding the Euromaidan movement, Ukrainians were united in the name of their national identity, the necessity to discover oneself in a foreign environment and the need to join people who are socially active and who would share similar interests as well as the desire to support one another. Being part of such a group enabled Ukrainians to reconstruct at least some part of their homeland whilst residing abroad.

Among the other reasons that motivated Ukrainians to act were the possibilities that were created by active engagement and the personality traits that made an individual more inclined to be engaged and participate in the activity of the Ukrainian community abroad. In Poland, many respondents valued the opportunities civic activity created for them. The activities of the Ukrainian minority were based largely on the traditions, religion and language which had been cherished and protected in family circles for decades.

The events that unfolded at Independent Square in Kyiv in 2013 constituted a focal point that motivated many Ukrainians to be more politically engaged. In both countries, many Ukrainians started contributing to the support of their home country for the first time in their lives. The annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation, its military aggression against Ukraine and support for the separatist movement in the Eastern parts of the country were additional catalysts for the Ukrainian community to become more consolidated and active. These events have noticeably strengthened the self-identification of Ukrainians with their homeland.

The events in Ukraine have had an influence on the willingness of its citizens living abroad to show solidarity with those who remained in the country during those difficult times. This willingness manifested itself, among others, in humanitarian aid and financial support. Moreover, Ukrainians wanted to defend the independence of their country – they held various events to support this cause and actively promoted their own Ukrainian identity in their host countries. Among the additional reasons for an increase in civic activity, respondents mentioned their hopes to stabilize the government institutions in Ukraine, which for many years have been considered corrupt.

The participants of the research were supportive of the idea to conduct reforms in Ukraine, albeit they also criticized the ineffectiveness of the process. This observation shows that Ukrainians have become increasingly interested in the future of their country; it has become a motivating factor for them, not an obstacle for further engagement in civic activity.

In the case of Germany, Ukrainians realized the importance of curbing Russian propaganda in the mass media, especially with regard to such notions as the alleged involvement of radical right-wing forces during the Euromaidan events. Ukrainians felt the need to bring the Ukrainian point of view regarding the events that were taking place in their country into the public discourse, thus providing a more objective source of information for German public. In Poland, mass media in general had a positive attitude toward Ukraine and activists didn't see contacts with media outlets (information campaigns) as an immediate priority (nevertheless, they were very active in the media during Euromaidan and afterwards).

To sum up, the nature of their activities changed after the events of the Euromaidan: the community residing abroad started to focus not only on initiatives targeted at its own members, but also began to represent and actively promote Ukraine in relations with the host communities in Poland and Germany.

Types and nature of civic activity

Ukrainians residing in Poland and Germany have carried out their activities both formally and informally. It is important to note that most often it was very hard to distinguish one type of activity from another, as for many individuals their activities were strongly interconnected in their daily lives. The initiatives that were born out of the Euromaidan events could be characterized as more spontaneous and less formal, established to target the ongoing needs of the population. Many respondents joined several initiatives or organizations. One should add that prior to the Euromaidan protests, it was possible to find more registered and active organizations assisting migrants in Poland than in Germany. However, researchers observed a stronger tendency to formalize activity particularly in Germany since 2015.

As a result of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the nature of civic activity expanded into new areas and took new forms in both of the analyzed countries. Previously, the civic activity of Ukrainians concentrated around cultural themes, but with the dramatic events surrounding the Euromaidan protest movement, it evolved into a new form of political activism, involving protests, demonstrations and humanitarian aid (medicine, clothes, food, equipment and money) which was delivered to those in need in Ukraine. Furthermore, as both the Polish and the German governments had supported the treatment of wounded activists and soldiers in the respective countries, Ukrainian volunteers had taken over the social care and support for the families of those individuals.

At the same time, the Ukrainian community didn't neglect the socio-cultural aspect of its activities, which was targeted mostly at Polish and German society. Many initiatives popularized Ukrainian culture, dispelled

negative myths about Ukraine and presented a Ukrainian point of view of the events. Ukrainians, however, also paid significant attention to the assessment of the political situation in the country and the reform process that had been initiated after the Euromaidan. These areas were of particular importance to activists in Germany, who felt the need to counteract a perceived one-dimensionality of German media and the influence of Russian propaganda.

As it was already mentioned, Polish and German society had different views on the nature of the events in Ukraine. Such a state of affairs had an influence on the nature of civic activity regarding the role of the mass media. In Poland, various media outlets were often interested in bringing Ukrainian experts into the debate to better inform Poles about the events on Independence Square and later about the consequences of the Euromaidan protest movement for the future of the country. In many cases, Ukrainians became regulars in the media, constituting a key source of information for Polish journalists. The German scenario was different because journalists were far less enthusiastic about a Ukrainian point of view; activists had to put a great deal of effort to reach at least minor media presence in Germany.

The role of religious institutions has to be mentioned separately, as churches played an important part in civic activity, albeit the nature of engagement in Poland and Germany was different. Churches, most notably Greek-Catholic, have played a significant role by creating a platform for activists to meet, network and exchange valuable information. The parishes in many cases were key for the success of civic activities by providing a free of charge venue for activists to meet and discuss their potential collaboration and joint activities. Moreover, in the case of the Ukrainian minority in Poland, religious institutions remain an important partner for maintaining Ukrainian cultural heritage and identity (traditions, language, etc.).

For the Ukrainian church in Poland, the greatest challenges identified by the study were the need to find new ways to attract the younger generation and the necessity to support migrants, who in recent years have started arriving from the central and eastern regions of Ukraine (including the war zone). In case of Germany, the role of the churches was less noticeable. Activists explained this observation by pointing out the relative organizational weakness of religious institutions in that country.

The number of Ukrainian students in Poland, and their concentration in certain educational facilities, is the reason why many respondents mentioned universities as important centers of civic activity. In Germany, institutions of higher education were rarely mentioned. In both countries, non-governmental organizations, either founded by Ukrainians or supporting them in statutory activities, contributed significantly to the rise and evolution of civic activity.

Relations among the members of the Ukrainian community in Poland and Germany

Civic activity in both countries changed the nature of relations inside the Ukrainian community. In Poland, the relations between migrants and the local minority improved thanks to the Euromaidan events, although it is important to add that these relations are still far from being ideal, as the organizations representing these groups pursue different goals in their daily activities. Additionally, respondents mentioned the generation gap as a factor having an impact on the effectiveness of the dialogue among members of the Ukrainian community.

Looking at the Ukrainian minority in Poland, one can see that the older generation still occupies the most important positions in its official structures. This state of affairs sometimes creates certain tensions within the minority, as well as between the minority and the younger generation of migrants who have come to Poland for educational purposes or seeking employment opportunities. Furthermore, the Ukrainian migrant community would benefit from consolidation and institutionalization, because the study showed that most initiatives in different parts of Poland are informal, with many carried out by individuals.

In Germany, the Euromaidan has led to the emergence of a *diasporic community*. Feelings of unity and solidarity have mitigated the differences between members of the old diaspora and the other groups of Ukrainians. Even the Ukrainians who had almost no contact with other groups prior to 2013 started to engage more in the activities of the *diasporic community*. However, similarly to Poland, many of the differences persisted after the events of Euromaidan came to an end.

The use of social media (Facebook in particular) has turned out to be a major factor contributing to the development of a stronger and more active community of Ukrainians. The use of the internet has not only enabled people to disseminate information in a faster and more efficient manner, but they have also allowed the representatives of the Ukrainian community to have a feeling of being present at the heart of events. The social media networks created a feeling of live participation in the protests and hence, motivated activists to continue their support whilst being outside their country. The social media, in a way, contributed to the development of social capital among Ukrainians, despite the evident differences among various groups.

Taking this observation into account, one could ask whether it is still possible to use traditional concepts to describe the development of diasporic stances, or whether we should introduce a new term – *virtual diaspora* – to reflect upon the unique nature of relations among Ukrainians during and after the Euromaidan. Members of the Ukrainian community residing abroad in many cases have the same access to information as those who live in the

country. Those who were abroad had the opportunity to participate in the public discussions pertaining to the future of their homeland. The new digital nature of activity offers relative freedom of movement and residence to those who can be considered activists. Research-wise, this poses a very interesting question about whether the developments pertaining to the evolution of the Ukrainian diaspora show us a new direction to study – the emergence of a transnational space which impacts the formation of a sense of community.

At the same time, the lack of visible differences within the framework of the virtual community helps to develop the social capital of Ukrainians, in particular due to the frequent interactions between individuals. Thus, the virtualization of civil society could become a valuable instrument to develop social capital during times when the role of traditional institutions (membership in political parties or trade unions) has been gradually declining. Further research is needed to answer whether the presence of virtual community has a positive effect on the integration of foreigners (migrants) into the host community.

Cooperation with and attitude toward the Ukrainian authorities

Ukrainian embassies and consulates remain important institutions for individuals staying abroad. Activists in both countries emphasized that relations with embassies had improved only after the regime of Viktor Janukovych had been dismantled. In Germany, members of the Ukrainian community were satisfied with how cooperation has been developing since 2015. Meetings of Ukrainian activists organized by the embassy were often praised as good practice. It is noteworthy that prior to the events of the Euromaidan the attitude toward the Ukrainian authorities was negative; moreover, activities had established an alternative institution to support one another in the office of the Heinrich Boell Foundation (Euromaidan Wache Berlin, which had offices situated just opposite from the embassy building).

In Poland, the events of the Euromaidan have had a positive influence on the relations between members of the Ukrainian community and local authorities in various regions of the country. In Germany, this type of cooperation with authorities on the local level occurred less frequently, which can be rationalized by the relatively low number of registered organizations that would be formally involved in official relations. Yet, it is important to add that the governments of Poland and Germany had both contributed additional financial resources to support Ukraine as a result of the protest movement.

Relations with the authorities have been assessed variously by the respondents; in a majority of cases the positive/negative feedback depended on the individual experiences of activists. However, certain general observations could be also drawn – for instance, many respondents in Poland shared their views about legalization procedures and have emphasized certain difficulties

they had to encounter. On the other side of the border, Poland was mentioned in a positive connotation when activists were describing the procedures pertaining to the establishment of non-governmental organizations, despite the fact that this procedure in the country is considered by many as being overly bureaucratic. In Germany, respondents were less enthusiastic about the same issue, emphasizing complicated registration procedures and the difficulties associated with receiving non-profit status for an organization.

Cooperation with host societies

Differences in the relations between Ukrainians and Polish or German society are dependent on the different socio-cultural environment, historical context and previous experience of cooperation. In Poland, the Euromaidan has strengthened the positive image of Ukraine by dispelling myths and stereotypes about this nation among members of the local population. In Germany, on the contrary, respondents complained about the lack of interest in Ukraine on the part of the local population. Many activists felt misunderstood and treated as Russians. This state of knowledge about Ukrainian society constitutes a clear obstacle for civic activity in Germany. As a result, one of the more important goals for Ukrainians in the near future is to raise the level of understanding and knowledge about Ukraine among Germans.

Despite the absence of a comprehensive legal-institutional framework (no official integration policy), support from Poland during the initial period after the Euromaidan has been more noticeable than that from Germany. This observation can be explained not only by the socio-cultural proximity of both countries, but also by the strong political will of the elites to provide support for Ukraine, taking into account the volatile situation in the country and the potential consequences of this instability for Poland. Moreover, Poland has witnessed a noticeable rise in the number of migrants since the first protests on Kyiv's Independence Square. In the case of Germany, respondents mentioned that only those German citizens who had previously cooperated with Ukrainians were willing to continue providing support. Cooperation between Ukrainian and German civil society should be considered an exception from the general weak collaboration on joint initiatives. As opposed to the Chernobyl catastrophe, the Euromaidan and the war in the Eastern Ukraine did not have a strong impact on the willingness of German society to support Ukrainian initiatives on a larger scale.

What was similar in Germany and Poland was that one could find many examples of cooperation between Polish/German Ukrainian migrant/minority organizations and initiatives/organizations in Ukraine. One of the main reasons that led to the establishment of relations between civil society representatives was the need to ensure the effective distribution of humanitarian aid. The Ukrainian minority in Poland declared its readiness

to share their experience from the transformation process in their country. Moreover, minority representatives were active in conducting seminars and workshops for Ukrainians. Significantly, they preferred to host citizens from Ukraine in Poland due to certain reservations about the real purposes of the activities of some Ukrainian NGOs. During and after the Euromaidan, activists in both countries made use of their existing contacts, but the protest movement had also created a chance for them to network on a larger scale.

Challenges to civic activity in Poland and Germany

For both communities of Ukrainians, the availability of resources and the proper professionalization of activity are important for the success of their initiatives in the future. Current experience in this regard is different in the two countries.

For Polish activists, the financial aspect plays an important role, as only few organizations can count on stable financial support. Overall, Ukrainian initiatives lack government support which would involve flexible financial instruments in support of their capacity building. At the same time, the initial enthusiasm about Ukraine has gradually faded in Polish society, and activists need to deal with the phenomenon of “Ukraine-fatigue.”

In Germany, the biggest support came from within the circle of the Ukrainian diaspora. Support from German society was noted only as an exception. Moreover, new organizations established by Ukrainians faced great obstacles when they had to compete for funds with German organizations due to their lack of experience in fundraising and the formalization of their activities. In many cases, activists were simply not aware of the possibilities to receive financial support.



This research documented a plethora of formal and informal organizations and initiatives stemming from the Ukrainian community in Poland and Germany. Their activity contributes to the popularization of topics related to their homeland in the public discourse of the host countries. Ukrainian activists abroad have contributed considerably to humanitarian aid and day-to-day assistance to people who are victims of war in Ukraine. In the majority of cases, Ukrainian activists abroad respect European values and try to promote them back home, hence contributing to the development of civil society in their country. Among others, due to such pro-democratic attitudes among members of Ukrainian communities abroad, the Polish and German authorities should be interested in supporting their initiatives. Moreover, support for the civic activity of migrants helps to develop their integration potential, which can have a positive impact on the development of civil society in the host country. The findings have enabled researchers to formulate several recommendations in order to help to better understand the nature of Ukrainians' civic activity in Poland and Germany and to show possible ways of supporting future initiatives.

Recommendations for the German authorities

▶ Cooperation between German and Ukrainian organizations/activists/initiatives

The research demonstrates that cooperation between German and Ukrainian citizens is barely noticeable. For the Ukrainian organizations, such cooperation constitutes a unique chance to gain more experience and learn best practices for the professionalization of their civic activity. More cooperation means more trustworthy and reliable information about Ukraine. For German organizations, co-operation with their Ukrainian colleagues means having a reliable partner and a good source of information about Ukraine. For example, an annual Ukrainian-German forum could become a good starting point to establish closer ties between various organizations. Such initiatives should be supported not only by civil society itself, but also receive patronage from official authorities (e.g., the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

▶ Capacity building

As it was noted several times in the publication, the Euromaidan has impacted the emergence of many new initiatives, organizations and movements. The people leading these initiatives often lack experience on how to proceed with further professionalization of their activities. Thus,

government must provide capacity building instruments for them which would foresee judicial consultations and the dissemination of relevant information. Though such initiatives often already exist on the local level, research shows that this type of support should also be introduced systematically on the central level.

▶ **Fundraising**

Respondents were often concerned with the lack of information on how to obtain financial support for their activity. It is important to note that information pertaining to available funds is distributed on the federal level. Additionally, quite often different organizations in a specific realm of civic activity share certain data between themselves. It seems that at this point the German government should invest more resources into consolidating different databases and make them more available (and possibly user friendly) for newcomers. Moreover, German funding practices should be revised. Mostly only experienced organizations are able to apply and receive support from the government. Furthermore, financial support on average is only granted for short to medium-term projects. In this state of affairs, new initiatives should receive more tailored support to be able to sustain their activities.

▶ **Voice of Ukraine**

Many of the activists that chose to participate in the research voiced their concern about the lack of Ukrainian expert opinion in the public discourse, especially during debates regarding events taking place in Ukraine. Mass media either neglect Ukrainian experts or prefer to use Russian specialists to speak about Ukraine. Yet, the German government has a good opportunity to bring the voice of Ukrainians into the debate by making use of the active expert environment of Ukrainian professionals living on its territory and ready to contribute their knowledge to present a more objective point of view on different developments in Ukraine.

Recommendations for the Polish authorities

▶ **Migration and integration policies**

The Polish authorities have to pay due attention to the growing number of Ukrainian migrants on their territory and create an appropriate integration environment for foreigners in the country. The presence of Ukrainians requires a strategic response from Poland, recognizing the importance of the biggest group of foreigners on the territory of the country. Such an approach has to be translated into comprehensive migration and integration policies. The lack of a well-elaborated approach toward the biggest migrant community in the country could result in its marginalization or ghettoization, which would have a negative impact on the social cohesion of society. The official

integration policy should take into account these important observations. The Euromaidan marked the beginning of the new wave of democratization of Ukraine, and Polish authorities have to make sure that it facilitates and doesn't obstruct the development of social capital among Ukrainians. The events of the Euromaidan have shown that migrant-led organizations are becoming an important member of the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue through official and non-official (civic) channels.

▶ **Fundraising**

Similarly to those in Germany, many Ukrainian organizations in Poland face obstacles in receiving external financial support. Less experienced activists have to compete with experienced Polish organizations that already have a track record of successfully implemented projects. Hence, the Polish authorities should pay more attention to supporting the newcomers, giving them an opportunity to professionalize their activity. The Polish government has to recognize the added value of migrant-led organizations in various policies.

▶ **Democratization of Ukraine**

The research has identified the troubling phenomenon of “Ukraine-fatigue,” which manifests itself in the declining enthusiasm of Poles toward support for the “never-ending” reform process in Ukraine. Taking these observations into account, the Polish government should facilitate the involvement of the Ukrainian community into the reform process. The potential of the Ukrainian minority is not fully developed. Many of its members are experienced professionals who are well-equipped culturally (knowledge of Ukrainian language and cultural context) to disseminate information about the transformation process that took place in Poland in 1990s. At the same time, the Polish government has to pay due attention to its co-operation with Ukrainian partners, choosing those organizations that represent the real needs of Ukrainian society. This does not mean that new organizations should be neglected. The Polish authorities need to make sure that they do not support those who are only driven by funds.

Recommendations for the Ukrainian authorities

▶ **The image of Ukraine**

It will come as no surprise that many respondents emphasized their lack of trust in government institutions. The image of the Ukrainian government, however, has been slowly improving after the Euromaidan. The Ukrainian authorities should invest more resources into creating a friendly and professional environment for their government which will generate more trust among their citizens. For those residing abroad, embassies and

consulates certainly embody the values standing behind the Ukrainian state, hence, such institutions should become a one-stop shop where citizens will be able to receive the information they require and get proper support in any legal matters that may arise during their stay abroad.

▶ **Cultural platform**

In Poland, the church has played for many years the role of a platform managing co-operation between various groups of active Ukrainians. Nevertheless, religious institutions face concrete challenges when being asked to act in secular life, and thus Ukrainian embassies emerge as a more appropriate place to lead the civic activities. Moreover, activists in Germany clearly communicated the need for a cultural center which would enable them to popularize Ukrainian traditions and help establish relations with one another. The establishment of a cultural center should be followed by regular meetings between representatives of Ukrainian and German/Polish organizations in order to network and exchange information on possible areas of co-operation.

▶ **The question of legitimacy**

Ukrainians residing in Poland see the Ukrainian authorities as a possible channel of support that could legitimize their activities in the eyes their Polish partners and society. Such support could manifest itself in financial assistance, but could also be provided through the presence of Ukrainian officials at various public events, thus confirming that Ukraine cares for its citizens abroad. It is important to add that Ukrainian officials should be ready to travel to different regions of Poland or Germany, as the research has confirmed that Ukrainian activity is not concentrated solely in the capitals.

Recommendations for Ukrainian activists in Poland and Germany

▶ **Professionalization of civic activity**

The formalization of civic activity has several important consequences for the success of civic activity. Above all, it helps non-formal initiatives sustain their activity and establish an effective dialogue with the authorities. A consolidated and professional environment makes it possible to represent the voice of the Ukrainian community in and outside the country more effectively.

▶ **Cooperation at the central and regional levels**

One should emphasize that the research found an abundance of initiatives operating across different regions of Poland and Germany. It is important to note that these initiatives should learn about one another (for instance, through new platforms of cooperation), establish closer ties and work on

a consolidated stance toward policies that are important for the Ukrainian community as a whole. In the case of Poland, the Euromaidan has shown that the representatives of minority and migrant organizations can find a common language and carry out joint activities. Such positive momentum has to be carried on to future cooperation while taking due account of the different statutory goals the organizations pursue in their daily work. Finally, organizations that originated in the Ukrainian community should look for potential partnerships with their Polish-German counterparts to learn best practice and bring the Ukrainian point of view into the discussion.

▶ **Fundraising**

The research indicated that the success of many civic initiatives will depend on their ability to raise additional funds to ensure the sustainability of their activities. Support from governments is one element of the puzzle. Activists should not, however, wait passively for the arrival of financial support, but rather try to explore the available options. Co-operation with Polish/German organizations and the establishment of networks of Ukrainian initiatives would contribute to greater success when it comes to receiving grants. For instance, in Germany one could use such tools as the handbook: *KOMMIT – Management-Handbuch für Migrantenorganisation* (RAA Brandenburg). The information portal Akquisos is another example of a useful source of information. In Poland, the portal ngo.pl provides comprehensive assistance to civil society actors in their daily activities.

▶ **Leadership**

The research findings in the Polish case furthermore suggest that the Ukrainian community should invest time and resources into support for new leaders who could effectively represent the voice of the various groups in the dialogue with the authorities. The Euromaidan revealed the great potential of the younger generation of Ukrainians, who could become the ones to unite the heterogeneous community. Young and often less experienced activists should be let into the ranks of the community and supported in their work. The authorities in sending and receiving countries should be ready to offer opportunities (workshops, fellowships, consultations, etc.) for talented Ukrainian youth to flourish and develop their skills.

Recommendations for the European Union

▶ **Financial support**

The EU should support initiatives that bring actual change to the development of civil society, as opposed to choosing those CSOs that fulfill formal criteria and have acquired knowledge on how to be proficient in fundraising. The EU has to develop information instruments that can reach

the most important target audience – new actors on the civil society scene that have shown willingness to act and have delivered in terms of practical results, but lack knowledge on how and where to get financial support for their activities. The European Endowment for Democracy is a promising step in the direction of supporting those who can't be heard through other channels, yet such instruments have to be followed by sufficient funding.

▶ **Liberalization of the visa regime**

When talking about Ukraine's European aspirations, respondents paid particular attention to the question of a visa-free regime, because such a decision on the part of the EU is seen as an important political and symbolic gesture. Whilst being outside the European family, the Ukrainian community struggles to maintain its strong motivation to further promote European values in the long-term perspective. The EU has to make sure that the European aspirations of Ukraine are being recognized on both practical and symbolic levels, because the Euromaidan could be arguably considered the most important event in recent years that reignited the European integration project.



STATUS OF UKRAINIANS IN POLAND	
Permanent Residence	20.252
Long-term EU Residence	2.796
Temporary Stay	42.451
Asylum	-
Refugee Status	2
Subsidiary	35
Humanitarian Reasons	202
Tolerated Stay	3
IN TOTAL	65.866


Source: Office for Foreigners data on total number of Ukrainian migrants holding valid residence permits (as of 01.01.2016)⁴

REASONS FOR STAY	2013	2014	2015	2016 (as of 30.04.2016)
Family	2450	2726	3888	3236
Education	2351	3798	7054	2668
Work	3863	8307	23925	11327
Other	931	2277	2997	-
IN TOTAL	9595	17108	37883	17231

Source: Office for Foreigners data on Ukrainian migrants who were granted temporary residence permits in Poland (issued decisions in 2013-2016)⁵

⁴ <http://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/zestawienia-roczne//> (accessed, 28.06.2016).

⁵ <http://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-specjalne/biezaca-sytuacja-dotyczaca-ukrainy//> (accessed, 28.06.2016).





Duration of stay in years (as of 2014)	Less than 4	4-8	8-10	10-15	15-20	20-30	30 and more	In Total
Ukrainian citizens	24.140	13.889	9.060	48.455	25.555	6.760	83	127.942

Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Migration Report 2014⁶) on the duration of stay of Ukrainian migrants in Germany.

Permit of residence – Reasons for stay	2011	2012	2013	2014
Family	1.772	1.937	2.141	2.642
Education	1.014	1.137	1.071	1.385
Work	1.441	1.495	1.304	1.759
Other	267	215	228	439

Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Migration reports 2011-2014⁷) on Ukrainian migrants who were granted permanent and non-permanent residence permits in Germany (issued decisions in 2011-2014).

⁶ Federal Office for Migration and Refugees Germany, <http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2013.html?nn=1663558> (accessed 30.06.2016).

⁷ Federal Office for Migration and Refugees Germany, <http://www.bamf.de/DE/DasBAMF/Forschung/Ergebnisse/Migrationsberichte/migrationsberichte-node.html> (accessed 30.06.2016).

